Over recent decades, a growing body of work in movement science, physiology, and perception has begun to converge on a view of human functioning that should be of direct relevance to our profession.

Across these fields, there has been a growing shift away from understanding action as something assembled step by step, following a decision to move. Instead, it is increasingly described as emerging from the continuous organisation of the organism as a whole, in relation to its environment.

For those of us working within the Alexander Technique, this presents both an opportunity and a challenge.

It is an opportunity because this emerging view resonates strongly with Alexander’s practical discoveries. It is a challenge because, as a profession, we have not yet articulated our work in a form that allows us to participate fully in this wider conversation.

We continue, to a significant extent, to rely on a familiar description of conscious control as a sequence: awareness of the stimulus, inhibition of any immediate response, the decision to coordinate oneself in relation to the stimulus, and the carrying out of the movement.

This description has clear pedagogical value. It helps students to differentiate aspects of their experience that would otherwise remain undifferentiated, and to recognise that reaction is not inevitable.

It is important to be clear, however, that this is a way of teaching rather than a literal account of how action is organised. Nor is the point that contemporary scientific accounts have somehow corrected an earlier misunderstanding. Rather, they are arriving, by different means, at descriptions that point in a similar direction.

But it does not describe the organisation of activity itself.

---

Organisation in Activity

When we look more closely at how living systems organise movement, a different picture appears. Long before any visible action occurs, the organism is already preparing itself. Subtle changes in tone, balance, and breathing are underway. Orientation is not something that follows a decision. It is already in process.

Experimental work in postural control makes this particularly clear. Studies by Victor Gurfinkel and his colleagues showed that the body reorganises itself in anticipation of voluntary movement, rather than simply responding once movement begins.¹

A similar shift can be seen in the work of Nikolai Bernstein, who argued that coordinated movement cannot be explained as the execution of pre-formed commands.² Coordination, in this view, is not specified in advance but emerges as a functional organisation of the whole system under particular conditions.

Moshe Feldenkrais, approaching movement from the perspective of learning, likewise observed that many difficulties in action arise not from structural limitations, but from habitual patterns of organisation that constrain what is possible.³

In the field of perception, James Gibson proposed that perception and action form a continuous system linking organism and environment.⁴ We do not first perceive and then act. Perception itself is already organised in relation to possible action.

Although these approaches differ in language and emphasis, they converge on a common insight: action is not assembled step by step. It emerges from organisation. Related developments in ecological dynamics have further elaborated this perspective, describing coordination as emerging under interacting constraints rather than being specified in advance.⁵

---

Control in Process

Alexander himself pointed in this direction when he insisted that,“Control should be in process, not superimposed.”⁶

He also drew attention to the difficulty of describing this in words, remarking that what appears to happen “one after the other” is, in fact, “all together.”⁷

The distinction is subtle but important. What we describe as stages in thought are not stages in the activity itself.

If control is not something applied to an action from the outside, then it cannot consist in a sequence of steps introduced before movement takes place. It must belong to the unfolding organisation of the activity itself.

Seen in this light, the familiar description of conscious control as a sequence begins to look less like an account of how coordination actually occurs, and more like a pedagogical device. This does not invalidate its use in teaching, but places it in relation to the process it is intended to make accessible.

This distinction matters pedagogically. Teachers may continue to use sequential language, but with an understanding that its purpose is to draw attention to conditions within which organisation can change, rather than to prescribe the order in which coordination occurs.

This shift has important consequences for how we understand our core concepts.

Inhibition, for example, is often described as a pause between stimulus and response. But if organisation is already underway before we become aware of acting, inhibition cannot be a simple interruption inserted into a sequence. It must be understood as preventing the organism from prematurely settling into a fixed pattern of organisation.

When the habitual response is not immediately enacted, the system remains adaptable. Alternative coordinations are able to emerge because the organisation has not yet become fixed.

Direction, similarly, cannot be understood as an instruction applied to the body prior to movement. It is not something done to the organism before action begins.

It is the natural organisation of the body in response to the intention to move: a coordination that orients itself within gravity and environment as the activity unfolds.

In practice, this organisation is not arbitrary. It is most evident when the head is free to go forward and up, as a consequence of an absence of pressure, so that the rest of the body organises itself accordingly.

The familiar formulation “head forward and up” can be understood in this light: not as an instruction to be applied, but as a description of how the body tends to organise itself when the conditions are optimal. In this sense, it functions less as a target to be achieved than as a reliable indicator of an organisation that has not become prematurely fixed.

When these relationships are misunderstood, control easily becomes something imposed. We introduce pressure where none is needed, attempting to “do” inhibition or to “apply” direction, and the result is often increased effort, rigidity, or loss of responsiveness. What was intended to free coordination becomes a new form of interference.

---

Application and Divergence

The Alexander Technique has evolved primarily as a practical, experiential method. Its transmission has relied on direct experience: on the teacher’s hands, on guided activity, and on the gradual recognition of habitual patterns. This has given it great strength.

But it has also meant that its underlying principles have often remained implicit.

These distinctions are not intended to replace established ways of teaching, but to clarify what those ways are pointing toward in practice.

Alexander’s own writings contain a rich body of observation and reflection, but they are not organised as a single, clearly defined conceptual framework. Observation, explanation, and broader speculation are interwoven, and their relative status is not always explicit.

As a result, different aspects of the work have been emphasised in different contexts. In some settings, the focus has been on posture and physical use; in others, on inhibition and the prevention of habitual reaction; in others again, on direction, awareness, or therapeutic outcomes.

These variations are not arbitrary. They reflect the range of applications through which the work has developed: education, performance, health, and personal development. Each context brings certain aspects into the foreground and gives rise to particular interpretations and ways of speaking.

This has also been one of the strengths of the Technique. It is often most effectively taught through application. People come with something they want or need to do, and they value practical means that help them do it with greater ease, coordination, or reliability. In this sense, the diversity of emphasis reflects the responsiveness of the work to real human concerns.

In the absence of a clearly articulated account of the underlying process, however, these different emphases can stand alongside one another without necessarily converging. The work is recognised in practice, but described in different ways depending on the context in which it is being taught or applied.

For example, the work may be described in terms of posture and “good use,” in terms of inhibition and the prevention of habitual reaction, or in terms of direction, awareness, or therapeutic effect. Each of these captures something real, but they do not always make explicit the common underlying organisation from which they arise.

There is also a more subtle risk. Where a shared conceptual language is not actively developed, inherited formulations can begin to take on a fixed status. Descriptions that originally served a practical and pedagogical purpose may come to be treated as if they were definitive accounts of how coordination itself operates.

In this form, the work can become self-referential. The language is preserved and repeated, but not always re-examined in the light of observation or in dialogue with related fields.

This is not unique to the Alexander Technique. It is a familiar stage in the development of many disciplines as they move from practical or experiential knowledge toward more explicit conceptual articulation. Early descriptions of movement and perception, for example, often focused on observable sequences or experiences before the emergence of accounts based on organisation and coordination. But it places a limit on further articulation, and on our ability to participate fully in a wider conversation about human functioning.

What remains less consistently articulated is the common conceptual language that would make clear what underlies these different expressions: how the organisation of the whole person gives rise to action in the moment.

The strength of the Technique has always lain in its practical transmission; any development of its conceptual language must remain accountable to that.

At the centre of this is a shift from sequence to organisation.

Habitual reactions do not simply produce incorrect movements. They narrow the organisation of the whole person very rapidly. Faced with a stimulus, effort localises, breathing becomes restricted, and perception aligns with the anticipated action.

Inhibition prevents this premature narrowing. It allows the system to remain open for a moment longer, so that coordination can reorganise more freely.

When this adaptability is maintained, the resulting organisation has a distinctive quality. The body is neither rigid nor slack. It remains responsive within the gravitational field. Support is distributed through the whole system, and movement can arise without localised effort.

We might describe this as elastic organisation within gravity—a shorthand for a condition in which the organism is dynamically supported without becoming fixed.

This is not an ideal to be imposed. It is a way of describing how the organism functions when it is not constrained by habitual patterns.

Seen in this way, the Alexander Technique is not simply a method for improving posture or relieving tension. It is a practical exploration of how human beings organise themselves in activity.

What distinguishes the Alexander Technique within this wider field—of work concerned with organisation, coordination, and perception—is that these principles of organisation in activity are not only described, but can be explored directly in practice, through guided activity in which changes in coordination can be directly perceived and modified in real time.

We can continue to operate largely within the conceptual language we have inherited, refining it incrementally and relying on its established usefulness in teaching.

Or we can take the opportunity to engage more directly with the emerging understanding of organisation, coordination, and perception, and develop a framework that allows the Alexander Technique to be recognised as part of this broader field.

If we do the latter, the work has the potential to contribute significantly. Few disciplines combine such a refined practical method with such direct access to the organisation of action.

If we do not, there is a risk that the work will increasingly be interpreted from outside, and perhaps absorbed into other frameworks, without our active participation.

Clearer articulation does not replace experience. It allows experience to be more readily recognised, communicated, and related to other fields.

More accurate conceptual language does more than clarify our own understanding. It places us alongside others working on related questions, often from different starting points and with different methods.

In this sense, clearer articulation brings us into contact with new allies.

Alexander anticipated this when he suggested that, when properly investigated, it would be found that there is nothing in his technique which is not in nature.⁸

The question, then, is not whether the work belongs within a wider field, but whether we are able to articulate it in a way that allows that connection to be recognised.

This is not a call to move away from Alexander. It is a call to take his work seriously enough to continue it.

He did not offer a finished system. He opened a line of inquiry.

The task now is to carry that inquiry forward in a form that allows it to meet the present moment.

Notes

1. Gurfinkel, V. S., Lipshits, M. I., & Popov, K. E. (1974). Isometric tension of leg muscles and the mechanics of standing. Human Physiology, 1, 155–163.

Gurfinkel’s work challenged the idea of posture as a passive or static support system. His research showed that standing involves continuous, distributed muscular activity and ongoing postural adjustment. The body reorganises itself in anticipation of movement, rather than merely reacting once movement has begun. This helped shift understanding away from linear stimulus–response models toward a view of posture and movement as dynamically organised processes.

2. Bernstein, N. A. (1967). The Coordination and Regulation of Movements. Oxford: Pergamon Press.

Bernstein argued that coordinated movement cannot be understood as the execution of fixed motor commands applied to separate parts of the body. He highlighted the “degrees of freedom” problem: the nervous system must organise many interacting variables simultaneously under changing conditions. Coordination, in this view, emerges through the functional organisation of the whole system rather than through pre-programmed sequences. His work has been highly influential in later approaches to motor control, systems theory, and ecological dynamics.

3. Feldenkrais, M. (1972). Awareness Through Movement. London: Harper & Row.

Feldenkrais approached movement difficulties primarily as limitations in learned organisation rather than as fixed structural defects. Through carefully guided movement exploration, he emphasised the role of awareness, variation, and reduced effort in allowing alternative coordinations to emerge. Although differing substantially in method and conceptual language from the Alexander Technique, his work similarly treats coordination as a dynamic and learnable organisation of the whole person.

4. Gibson, J. J. (1979). The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Gibson rejected the idea that perception consists primarily in the internal processing of sensory information followed by action. Instead, he proposed that organisms perceive their environment directly in terms of possibilities for action, which he termed “affordances.” Perception and action therefore form a continuous system linking organism and environment. Gibson’s ecological approach has been highly influential in contemporary work on perception, coordination, skill acquisition, and ecological dynamics.

5. Davids, K., Button, C., & Bennett, S. (2008). Dynamics of Skill Acquisition: A Constraints-Led Approach. Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics.

Work in ecological dynamics extends earlier developments in movement science and ecological psychology by describing coordination as emerging under interacting constraints rather than being specified in advance through fixed motor programmes. These constraints include the characteristics of the organism, the environment, and the task itself. From this perspective, skilled action arises through the self-organisation of the whole system in relation to changing conditions. Ecological dynamics draws particularly on the work of Bernstein and Gibson, integrating the study of coordination, perception, and action within a unified framework.

6. Alexander, F. M. Teaching Aphorisms: The Alexander Journal No 7, 1972, published by the Society of Teachers of the Alexander Technique. Also published in Articles and Lectures by Mouritz (1995). 

7. Alexander, F. M. Teaching Aphorisms: The Alexander Journal No 7, 1972, published by the Society of Teachers of the Alexander Technique. Also published in Articles and Lectures by Mouritz (1995). 

8. Alexander, F. M. Teaching Aphorisms: The Alexander Journal No 7, 1972, published by the Society of Teachers of the Alexander Technique. Also published in Articles and Lectures by Mouritz (1995): “When an investigation comes to be made, it will be found that every single thing we are doing in the work is exactly what is being done in Nature where the conditions are right, the difference being that we are learning to do it consciously.”